DEFINITION:
Within the context of Classical virtue ethics, the term “justice” refers to the virtue, or character trait, consisting of the propensity to act in accordance with what is right, equitable, or fair.
“Justice,” in this context, means allotting to each person what is due to him according to the natural or positive law.
ETYMOLOGY:
“Justice” is one of the four Classical “cardinal virtues.” It is a translation of the Latin word iustitia, which is, in turn, a translation of the Greek word dikaiosunē.
The English word “justice” is attested from the twelfth century. It derives from Latin iustitia via Middle English and Old French.
The Latin noun iustitia itself is connected to the adjective iustus, meaning “just,” “equitable,” “right,” or “lawful.”
DISCUSSION:
According to Aristotle’s thought (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II), the virtues represent a mean between two extremes. In the case of “justice,” the extreme of deficiency is indulgence, while the extreme of excess is pitilessness.
“Justice” in the classical sense fundamentally involves the idea of desert: what one deserves in relation to the morality or legality of one’s actions.
“Justice” is an important virtue for two reasons. One is practical, or consequentialist: It is the basis upon which the stability of the social order ultimately rests.
The other reason is theoretical, or deontological: “Justice” is the essential core of morality (the ethical “ought”). As such, it exerts a categorical (unconditional) demand upon each of us by virtue of our very humanity.
This second aspect of “justice” is memorably expressed in the famous Latin aphorism: Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus [Let justice be done, though the world perish].