Paul E. Meehl

Brief Biography

Paul Everett Meehl was born Paul Swedal in 1920 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He later adopted the surname of his stepfather.

Meehl’s mother died when he was 16. He has stated that as a result of her death he became disillusioned with medical practice.

For college, Meehl attended the nearby University of Minnesota, from which he received his bachelor’s degree summa cum laude in 1941, with a double major in psychology and biometry.

He went on to attend graduate school at the same institution, obtaining his PhD in clinical psychology, with a minor in neuropsychiatry, in 1945.

Meehl’s dissertation advisor was Starke R. Hathaway, one of the two original authors of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). A few years later, Meehl would be heavily involved in the further refinement of the MMPI.

Immediately upon receiving his doctorate, Meehl accepted a teaching position from the University of Minnesota, where he spent his entire academic career.

Meehl was a forceful advocate of the application of biometric and statistical methods to the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness, as opposed to psychoanalytic and intuitive approaches.

Meehl’s strong interest in the methodology of the social sciences led him to publish several papers in the field of philosophy of science. In 1953, he joined forces with philosophers Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to found the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, whose house  journal Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science swiftly became one of the preeminent journals in the discipline of philosophy of science.

His first major publication, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954)—which contained a strong indictment of “clinical” (intuitive) approaches to mental illness and a passionate plea for a wider reliance upon statistical and other algorithmic predictive models—provoked a good deal of controversy in the fields of clinical psychology and psychotherapy.

In 1962, Meehl was elected President of the American Psychological Association (APA).

Over the course of his career, Meehl published around 180 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters, in addition to about a dozen books, which he either authored, co-authored, or edited.

Meehl died in 2003 at the age of 83.

Notable Quotes

Note: The original sources of the following quotations attributed here to Paul E. Meehl are provided where known. If no specific source is mentioned, then the attributed quotation may be assumed to derive from or (perhaps via paraphrase) be inspired by Meehl’s many academic and popular writings.

Clinical Psychology

The field of clinical psychology is a wilderness of competing schools and theories.

“Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences,” in Paul E. Meehl, Psychodiagnosis: Selected Papers; pp. 225–302 (1973).

Adequate assessment of the validity of a diagnostic procedure must compare the distribution of the criterion variable with the distribution of the diagnostic variable in the same population.

“Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores,” with Albert Rosen, Psychological Bulletin, 52: 194-216 (1955).

What clinicians do and think are often hopelessly at variance.

Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954).

One major problem is that psychology has not been a cumulative science, it has been a degenerating one. It’s the only science where the accumulated knowledge base has been shrinking over time instead of increasing.

“Psychology: The Experimental Study of Behavior,” in Henry Quastler, ed., Information Theory in Psychology: Problems and Methods; pp. 451-482 (1955).

In order to use theoretical concepts fruitfully in making predictions for concrete cases, one requires a well-corroborated theory, which has high verisimilitude and includes almost all of the relevant variables, and an accurate technology of measurement, including access to the initial and boundary conditions of the system to be predicted and negligible influence of . . . “contingency factors.” None of these conditions is met in our routine clinical forecasting situation.

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality and Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

Corroboration

Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching ½ of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by “success” is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision.

“Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox,” Philosophy of Science, 34: 103–115 (1967).

The corroboration of a theory cannot prove its truth, but can only increase its probability.

“The Problem is Epistemology, Not Statistics: Replace Significance Tests by Confidence Intervals and Quantify Accuracy of Risky Numerical Predictions,” in Lisa L. Harlow, Stanley A. Mulaik, and James H. Steiger, eds., What If There Were No Significance Tests?; pp. 393–425 (1997).

Empirical Evidence

Theories, hypotheses, and intuitions are going to get us only so far, and after that, we must sit down and let the data do the talking.

The wise psychologist, therefore, is never cocksure about any set of empirical generalizations, and he keeps in mind the possibility that future data may “make a monkey” out of his present favorite theory.

“Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox,” Philosophy of Science, 34: 103–115 (1967).

Science is not about certainty; it’s about probability. We can never know anything for sure, but we can make educated guesses based on the available evidence.

The true test of a scientific theory is not whether it is elegant or intuitively appealing, but whether it withstands rigorous empirical scrutiny. Ultimately, it is the evidence that should guide our beliefs, not our preconceptions or biases.

The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not “Eureka!” but “That’s funny…”

For the good of the soul, one must periodically turn away from facts, toward what could have been, toward the marvelous and the terrifying.

“Wanted—A Good Cookbook,” American Psychologist, 11: 263–272 (1956).

Grand Unified Theory

I believe that a grand unified theory for the human sciences, or at least for personality and social psychology, is within reach—but only if we break out of the straitjacket of the present paradigm.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

History of Science

The history of science is the story of how our understanding of the world has evolved over time. What we know today may seem obvious in hindsight, but it was often hard-won through centuries of inquiry and debate.

The history of science is littered with discarded theories and failed experiments. But each failure brings us closer to the truth, as long as we are willing to learn from our mistakes.

Human Nature

The most basic of all human needs is the need to understand and be understood. The best way to understand people is to listen to them.

“Foreword,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 16: xi–xvii (2001).

Intellectual Humility

The most dangerous idea in science is the belief that we have all the answers. Intellectual humility is essential for progress, as it allows us to remain open to new evidence and alternative explanations.

“Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It,” Psychological Inquiry, 1: 108–141 (1990).

Judgment

A researcher who wants to know whether he has a significant effect must look at his data and use his judgment. He cannot replace this judgment by a formal calculation.

Human judgment is hopelessly inadequate. The old saying, “You can’t fool Mother Nature,” is as false as it is hoary. You can fool Mother Nature, quite easily.

Mathematical Formalization

My thesis in a nutshell: There is no convincing reason to assume that explicitly formalized mathematical rules and the clinician’s creativity are equally suited for any given kind of task, or that their comparative effectiveness is the same for different tasks. Current clinical practice should be much more critically examined with this in mind than it has been.

Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954).

If I were to start my teaching career over again, I would not concentrate on psychology or social work but rather on mathematics, particularly statistics. Because of the changes that will be coming in the next few decades, psychologists are going to need a lot more mathematical competence than they currently have.

“Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It,” Psychological Inquiry, 1: 108–141 (1990).

Meehl on Meehl

In my early teens, I had intended to be a lawyer, but a copy of Karl Menninger’s The Human Mind (1930) fell into my hands. Because it was effective dramatic bibliotherapy for me, I decided overnight to change my vocational goal to psychotherapist.

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality and Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

I have learned to develop a certain Buddhistic detachment . . . Suppose a social worker confidently tells me that of course we can predict how this delinquent will do on probation by reflecting on psychodynamic inferences and subjective impressions, recorded in a 10-page presentence investigation, despite the malignant rap sheet record and acting-out psychometrics, and the officer’s comment that “he’s a real mean, tough street kid.” Well, I remind myself that Omniscient Jones has not put me in charge of reforming the world.

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality and Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

Morality

Science is a moral enterprise and it is not possible to do good science without a profoundly ethical attitude.

Neurosis

What makes a problem “neurotic” is not that a large percentage of people are inherently incapable of solving it, but that the solution to it lies outside the range of their present conscious awareness.

“What is Psychotherapy?,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 144: 1413–1415 (1950).

Personality Theory

I do not believe that it is overly pessimistic to say that the trend of much current personality theory and research toward nominalism and atheoretical formalism bodes ill for the long-term growth of the discipline.

“The Selfish Ledger and the Pluralist Revolution,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 297–299 (1977).

Philosophy

Although some scientists can be ignorant of philosophy, most scientists do philosophy in the absence of awareness.

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

Prediction

Statistical prediction is almost always superior to intuitive prediction, and the latter should be relegated to the entertainment industry.

Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954).

Theories should be judged not only by their explanatory power but also by their predictive accuracy. A theory that consistently fails to make accurate predictions is unlikely to be a reliable guide to understanding the world.

The strength of a scientific theory lies not in its ability to explain the data we already have, but in its capacity to generate testable predictions that can be confirmed or falsified through empirical investigation.

Science is not about proving things with absolute certainty; it’s about developing models that are consistent with the available evidence and predictive of future observations.

“Why Summaries of Research on Psychological Theories Are Often Uninterpretable,” Psychological Reports, 66: 195–244. (1990).

Progress

There is no greater impediment to progress in the sciences than the uncritical acceptance of the conceptual framework of a prevailing theory.

Scientific progress often requires us to challenge conventional wisdom and question deeply held beliefs. It’s not always comfortable, but it’s essential for intellectual growth.

Scientific progress is not a smooth, linear path; it’s a messy process characterized by fits and starts, dead ends, and unexpected discoveries.

One of the major sources of resistance to scientific progress is, of course, intellectual inertia, that is, the tendency of people to cling to their beliefs long after they have been discredited.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

Psychoanalysis

[P]sychoanalytic therapy . . . is far less important quantitatively than it was 30 years ago . . .

First, contemporary psychoanalytic therapy is rarely classical and lays far less emphasis on interpretation of unconscious thematic content and historical constructions than in Freud’s day . . .

Second, there is more evidence of relatively poor interanalyst reliability of inferences from the same dream, the same associations, or the same projective productions.

Third, the efficacy of psychoanalysis as a treatment mode is now known to be relatively poor compared to behavior modification and rational emotive therapy. It is possible for a sane, rational, informed person to doubt that psychoanalysis, in anything like the form that emphasizes complex inferences to unconscious processes, is an effective procedure at all . . . 

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality and Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

Schizophrenia

There is no such thing as schizophrenia.

“Schizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia,” American Psychologist, 17: 827–838 (1962).

The Scholar’s Function

[T]he [scholar’s] social function is to think as clearly and objectively as human frailty permits and to publish the deliverances of his or her cerebration in the most effective way possible. But the scholar, the professional intellectual—unlike the preacher, politician, or advertising agent—is not mainly in the public relations business. When a scholar has done a responsible job of thinking and communicating his or her thoughts, the task is at an end.

“Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book,” Journal of Personality and Assessment, 50: 370–375 (1986).

Science

The criterion of good science is not whether it adheres to certain absolute methods, but whether it produces good practical results.

The goal of science is not certainty but understanding. We may never have all the answers, but each new discovery brings us closer to a deeper appreciation of the mysteries of the universe.

The scientific attitude is one of skepticism, open-mindedness, and a willingness to follow the evidence wherever it leads, even if it challenges our preconceptions.

Science is a self-correcting enterprise. Errors and biases are inevitable, but through careful observation, replication, and critical analysis, we can gradually refine our understanding of the world.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

In science, as in life, there are no guarantees. We must be prepared to accept uncertainty and ambiguity, recognizing that our knowledge is always provisional and subject to revision.

Science is not a body of knowledge, but a way of thinking. It’s about asking questions, seeking evidence, and subjecting our ideas to empirical scrutiny. In the end, it’s not about being right, but about being less wrong.

The scientific method is not a recipe to be followed blindly; it’s a set of principles to guide our inquiry and help us navigate the complexities of the natural world.

The essence of good science is not just getting the right answers, but asking the right questions.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

Science is a marathon, not a sprint. It requires patience, perseverance, and a willingness to tolerate setbacks and frustrations along the way.

Scientists

The good scientist, like the good detective, must be willing to follow the data wherever they lead him, even if they point to a conclusion that seems to violate cherished theoretical assumptions.

If you want to be a good scientist, you should be able to follow what are called simple recipes—simple but not necessarily easy.

The most important quality a scientist can possess is intellectual honesty. We must be willing to acknowledge when our hypotheses are unsupported by the evidence and revise our theories accordingly.

The hallmark of a mature scientist is the ability to tolerate ambiguity and complexity without resorting to oversimplification or dogmatism.

Good scientists are not only driven by curiosity and a desire for truth; they also possess the courage to follow their findings wherever they may lead, even if it means challenging deeply entrenched beliefs.

“Wanted—A Good Cookbook,” American Psychologist, 11: 263–272 (1956).

Statistics

“Statistical significance” plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental “cuteness” and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation.

“Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox,” Philosophy of Science, 34: 103–115 (1967).

Most psychologists, in and out of universities, are not equipped to do statistical work at the level of sophistication needed to understand a moderately complex piece of published research.

“Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It,” Psychological Inquiry, 1: 108–141. (1990).

Although most of us pay lip service to the empirical decision procedure of rejecting the null hypothesis if the obtained significance value is less than 0.05, in practice a substantial number of psychologists reject the null hypothesis only when the significance value is less than 0.01 or even 0.001.

“Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox,” Philosophy of Science, 34: 103–115 (1967).

Theory

Theories are nets cast to catch what we call “the world”: to rationalize, to explain, and to master it. We endeavor to make the mesh ever finer and finer.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress.

The best experimental design is the one that minimizes the probability of getting a significant result due to some artifact, confound, or bias, while maximizing the probability of getting a significant result if the theoretical hypothesis is true.

In science, as in life, things often turn out to be more complicated than they initially appear. Our theories are simplified models of reality, and the real world is often messier than we would like it to be.

Theories are like maps: they simplify and organize the complexity of the world, but they are not the territory itself. A good theory is one that helps us navigate the terrain of reality effectively.

“Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox,” Philosophy of Science, 34: 103–115 (1967).

Theories are not discovered; they are invented. They are human creations designed to make sense of the world, and as such, they are subject to revision and improvement.

“Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It,” Psychological Inquiry, 1: 108–141 (1990).

Perhaps the easiest way to convince yourself is by scanning the literature of soft psychology over the last 30 years and noticing what happens to theories. Most of them suffer the fate that General [Douglas] MacArthur ascribed to old generals—They never die, they just slowly fade away. In the developed sciences, theories tend either to become widely accepted and built into the larger edifice of well-tested human knowledge or else they suffer destruction in the face of recalcitrant facts and are abandoned, perhaps regretfully as a “nice try.” But in fields like personology and social psychology, this seems not to happen. There is a period of enthusiasm about a new theory, a period of attempted application to several fact domains, a period of disillusionment as the negative data come in, a growing bafflement about inconsistent and unreplicable empirical results, multiple resort to ad hoc excuses, and then finally people just sort of lose interest in the thing and pursue other endeavors.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

A theory is not just a gadget or toy which satisfies a passing whim. It is an attempt to represent a piece of reality, something we sincerely believe to exist, and the desire to do justice to it is akin to the aspiration for truth.

“Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46: 806–834 (1978).

Theories should not be accepted by a group, a community, or a scientific subculture unless they have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

“Appraising and Amending Theories: The Strategy of Lakatosian Defense and Two Principles That Warrant It,” Psychological Inquiry, 1: 108–141 (1990).

Therapy

In the long run, success in therapy is a matter of character. As a rule, it is people of character who find themselves.

“What is Psychotherapy?,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 414: 1413–1415 (1950).

Truth

The “truth” is what most of the people believe at the present time, but may be disconfirmed later.

“Schizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia,” American Psychologist, 17: 827–838 (1962).